Can Your Brain Imagine Two Things at the Same Time?

When two mental experiences combine, does a new neural state emerge?

Attention · EEG · Mental Imagery · Brain–Computer Interfaces · Metanoia

When we imagine two actions, does the brain create a combination or something different?

Imagine listening to a familiar song. Without moving your hands, you begin imagining yourself tapping your fingers on a table to its rhythm. At the same time, you mentally sing the lyrics.

Now separate these experiences. First, imagine only singing. Then, imagine moving your hand. Finally, combine both actions.

Your body remains still, but what happens to your brain activity?

Does imagining two actions simultaneously simply combine two neural patterns, or does it produce a different organization of brain activity?

This question connects an everyday experience with the research of Hadi Mohammadpour and Sarah D. Power (2026), Dual imagery tasks for EEG-based brain–computer interfaces, published in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.

The researchers investigated whether combinations of mental imagery tasks could be distinguished using electroencephalography (EEG), potentially expanding the capabilities of brain–computer interfaces.

Their contribution is significant because it turns a subjective experience—imagining actions—into an experimental problem involving the classification of brain states.

1. How can imagination become a command?

A brain–computer interface (BCI) uses information from brain activity to control external systems.

Someone might imagine moving their right hand to represent one command and their left hand to represent another. A computer analyzes features of EEG signals to identify the corresponding intention.

However, as the number of commands increases, classification can become more difficult.

Mohammadpour and Power investigated a different possibility: rather than relying exclusively on new individual imagery tasks, could we combine tasks already being used?

If imagining singing and imagining moving a hand produce distinguishable patterns, what happens when both experiences occur simultaneously?

This possibility could be particularly relevant to interfaces designed for people with motor impairments, although the study investigated technical feasibility rather than clinical application.

2. The experimental design: eight mental states

The study recruited 14 healthy, right-handed participants. Data from 12 participants were included in the final analyses.

The researchers organized eight experimental conditions: imagining movement of the right hand, left hand, or both feet; imagining singing a familiar song; three combinations of singing and imagined movements; and a resting condition.

Motor imagery was not intended to be merely visual. Participants were instructed to imagine the sensations associated with movements without physically performing them.

Similarly, imagining singing involved mentally representing movements of the mouth, tongue, and jaw.

Each condition was presented 60 times, with four-second imagery periods distributed across experimental blocks.

EEG activity was recorded using a 64-channel actiCHamp system from Brain Products, allowing researchers to analyze electrical brain activity during the different tasks.

The signals were subsequently processed computationally, extracting spatial and spectral features. Classification algorithms attempted to identify the condition corresponding to each recording.

The researchers evaluated classification problems involving three, four, seven, and eight mental states.

The objective was not simply to determine where individual imagery processes occur, but whether different combinations could be recognized through their electrophysiological characteristics.

3. What did the researchers discover?

The results demonstrated that combined imagery tasks contained useful information for classification.

Under the best configurations, average classification accuracy reached approximately 64.1% for three classes and 63.0% for four classes.

When all eight conditions were considered, average accuracy was 50.3%.

For comparison, randomly choosing among eight equally probable categories would produce approximately 12.5% accuracy.

Therefore, the results were above chance.

However, approximately half of the classifications remained incorrect in the eight-state problem.

This means the approach shows potential but requires substantial improvements before providing reliable control in demanding practical applications.

The principal finding is that combining imagery tasks can expand the repertoire of mental states distinguishable through EEG.

It does not mean the researchers demonstrated new synapses, new anatomical circuits, or independent forms of consciousness.

Their contribution lies in demonstrating the possibility of recognizing functional patterns associated with combined mental experiences.

4. Does imagining two things require more attention?

The researchers also examined how participants perceived task difficulty.

In general, combined conditions were considered more difficult than individual tasks.

When choosing which tasks they would prefer to use daily to control a computer, ten of the twelve analyzed participants preferred simpler tasks.

Among the combinations, imagining moving both feet while mentally singing was preferred.

These observations demonstrate that a greater variety of classifiable states does not necessarily mean greater ease of use.

An interface may recognize a particular neural pattern while the user experiences the task as tiring or difficult.

We also cannot assume that greater subjective difficulty corresponds directly to increased brain activation.

The relationship between attention, perceived effort, and electrical activity depends on task characteristics and individual strategies.

This brings the research closer to an important question about high performance: does learning mean mobilizing more resources or using them differently?

5. Does combining tasks represent a new neural state?

We must distinguish an experimental result from its interpretation.

The study showed that patterns associated with combined tasks can be statistically differentiated from patterns associated with individual tasks.

But this does not fully reveal how these experiences are organized at the subjective level.

Different neural processes may contribute simultaneously to the recorded activity. It is also possible that attention rapidly alternates between task components.

EEG alone cannot completely resolve this distinction.

Furthermore, computational identification of a class does not necessarily mean that an entirely new brain state exists independently of the others.

Classifying a mental experience is different from fully explaining how that experience occurs.

The researchers' achievement is establishing a concrete experimental possibility for investigating combinations of imagery through objective measurements of brain activity.

6. From encounter A to B: what changes when we imagine again?

Building on this contribution, BrainLatam proposes an additional question.

Consider the following sequence:

A — First encounter: Imagine only moving your right hand.

B — Second encounter: Imagine moving the same hand while mentally singing.

A again — Re-encounter: Return to imagining the isolated hand movement.

Would the brain activity observed during the re-encounter be equivalent to the initial recording?

Or could the combined experience temporarily modify expectations, strategies, and characteristics of neural signals?

Mohammadpour and Power did not demonstrate a persistent transformation of this kind. Their study was designed to evaluate the classification of mental imagery tasks.

Nevertheless, their findings allow new experiments to be proposed, comparing task sequences, performance, and EEG patterns before and after combined imagery.

Distinguishing temporary changes from lasting learning would be essential.

7. Attention, priming, and possibilities for modulation

Priming investigates how previous experiences influence the processing of subsequent information.

Neural plasticity involves functional or structural changes associated with activity and experience.

These phenomena were not directly demonstrated by the classification performed in the study, but they suggest directions for future research.

Researchers could investigate whether practice modifies perceived difficulty, classifier accuracy, or the stability of brain activity patterns.

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) could also contribute to future studies by testing the causal involvement of specific brain regions in organizing these tasks.

However, its use would only be justified by an experimental question that EEG and behavioral measures alone cannot adequately answer.

The central contribution remains Mohammadpour and Power's: they demonstrated the feasibility of expanding combinations of classifiable mental states.

8. Does attention transform the organism that imagines?

A musician imagines a melody while anticipating movements. A pilot mentally represents a maneuver before executing it. An experienced baker anticipates the consistency of dough before touching it.

These examples do not reproduce the experimental protocol, but they illustrate why coordinating mental experiences deserves investigation.

From BrainLatam's perspective, every encounter takes place within an organism carrying previous experiences.

The next encounter may be influenced by memories, expectations, physiological states, and previously developed strategies.

This interpretation connects the discussion to Metanoia, understood here as a hypothesis concerning the transformation of the Body–Territory (Corpo-Território) through successive encounters.

However, identifying differences in EEG patterns is not sufficient to demonstrate such a transformation.

We must investigate persistence, transfer to new tasks, and meaningful behavioral changes.

Mohammadpour and Power's research provides an important starting point: combined mental experiences can produce distinguishable patterns of brain activity.

The next question is whether learning to combine these experiences changes how we subsequently imagine, perceive, and act.

In Blog 02, we will move from imagination to actual movement: after a sleepless night, who is controlling your steps?

Because the same world may be encountered by an organism operating under very different physiological conditions.

Main scientific reference: Mohammadpour, H., & Power, S. D. (2026). Dual imagery tasks for EEG-based brain–computer interfaces: A feasibility study of combinatorial mental state classification. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 20, 1912998.

BRAINLATAM | W47/2026 | BLOG 01/12 — ENGLISH VERSION